Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 45
Number 1 Winter 2023

Article 5

Winter 2023

EA Sports: It’s in the Federal Legislation
Gia Silahian

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the
Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gia Silahian, EA Sports: It’s in the Federal Legislation, 45 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 75 (2023).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol45/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized
editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

EA Sports: It’s in the Federal Legislation
BY GIA SILAHIAN*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 76
II. THE NCAA AND AMATEURISM .................................................... 79
III. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND FOR STUDENT-ATHLETE NIL ........... 81
A. Litigation Under Previous NIL Policies ........................... 81
1. Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc. ..................................... 81
2. Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. ........................................ 82
3. O’Bannon v. NCAA.................................................... 83
4. NCAA v. Alston.......................................................... 85
B. The Modern State of Student-Athlete NIL ....................... 86
IV. COLLEGE ATHLETES CAN PROFIT OFF THEIR NIL: NOW WHAT?
................................................................................................ 88
A. Individual Licensing and NIL Valuation .......................... 89
B. The Bar Against Co-Licensing and Co-Branding ............. 91
C. A “Team” Without Group Licensing ................................ 93
V. FEDERAL LEGISLATION IN THE ENDZONE .................................... 96
A. Pending Federal Bill Proposals ......................................... 97
B. Hail Mary: An Independent, Third-Party Licensing Entity
........................................................................................ 100
1. Formation and Oversight .......................................... 100
2. Group Licensing and Royalty Distribution ............... 102
3. Co-Branding School Intellectual Property with StudentAthlete NIL ............................................................... 105
VI. TOUCHDOWN: EA SPORTS COLLEGE FOOTBALL ...................... 106
VII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 109
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., 2020,
University of Southern California. Special thanks to Comm/Ent’s fantastic staff editors for their hard
work in editing this Note, and to Maddie Giles for spearheading the process seamlessly. This Note is
dedicated to my father for tolerating my many late-night phone calls, to Alaura McGuire and Mary Saade,
who couldn’t care less about sports but let me rant about it anyway, and to Reggie Bush, who continues
to fight for what’s rightfully his.
[75]

76

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

45:1

I. INTRODUCTION
At a press conference held on May 18, 2022, the University of
Alabama’s head coach, Nick Saban, accused Texas A&M University (Texas
A&M) of “buying” every player in its top-ranked college football recruiting
class through “name, image, and likeness” (“NIL”) deals.1 Less than twentyfour hours later, Texas A&M’s head coach, Jimbo Fisher, hosted an
impromptu press conference of his own, retorting that “there are no [NIL]
violations,” because “nothing was promised” to players in exchange for their
commitment to play football at Texas A&M.2 But beyond his eleven-minute,
arguably entertaining, rant about Saban, Fisher drew attention to a glaring
issue in intercollegiate athletics: “There never has been parity.”3 Put in the
context of NIL, college athletes can now permissibly receive what the
Southeastern Conference (SEC) has provided its players with for years:
compensation.4
Historically, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
prohibited collegiate athletes from the commercialization of their NIL,
affording itself the exclusive right to license and use student-athlete NIL.
The NCAA’s uncompensated use of student-athlete NIL prompted numerous
legal challenges against the NCAA and its rules barring compensation, with
players alleging misappropriation of their right of publicity and violations of
federal antitrust law.5
Entangled in the litigation concerning student-athletes’ right of
publicity was video game developer and manufacturer, Electronic Arts, Inc.
(“EA”).6 For nearly twenty years, EA produced an annual NCAA-branded
college football video game, wherein users could control digital avatars

1. See Alabama Crimson Tide, Nick Saban: Texas A&M ‘Bought Every Player’ in No. 1 Recruiting
Class,
Alabama
‘Didn’t
Buy
One’,
YOUTUBE
(May
18,
2022),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0oxZKXBvbOI.
2. TexAgs, Watch: Jimbo Fisher Holds Press Conference to Respond to Nick Saban, YOUTUBE
(May 19, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4L0MhfCV04.
3. Id.; see also Jesse Simonton, Jimbo Fisher vs. Nick Saban: Best Bars and Burns from an AllTime Press Conference, ON3 (May 19, 2022), https://www.on3.com/news/jimbo-fisher-vs-nick-sabanthe-best-quotes-press-conference-nil/.
4. For purposes of transparency, it should be noted that this statement is largely speculation.
However, recent tweets calling out Alabama’s recruiting “tactics” seem to corroborate this sentiment.
See, e.g., Leon O’Neal Jr. (@WakeEmUp9), TWITTER (May 18, 2022, 8:18 PM),
https://twitter.com/WakeEmUp9/status/1527126565187792896 (“Every player there had a [Scat Pack]
[Hellcat] before NIL I was in a Nissan Maxima lol”); Su’a (@iammsuzy), TWITTER (May 19, 2022, 7:52
AM), https://twitter.com/iammsuzy/status/1527301080119291904 (“I’ve worked out with a few guys
during off-seasons that literally would say I was making more at Bama than the current PSquad they’re
on.”).
5. See discussion infra Sections III.A.1-4.
6. About, ELEC. ARTS, INC., https://www.ea.com/about (last visited Apr. 11, 2022). The NCAAbranded video games were sold under “EA Sports.” For purposes of this Note, “EA” is used
synonymously with EA Sports.
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representing college football players in simulated matches.7 EA designed
NCAA Football with the goal of providing consumers with a realistic college
football experience.8 To accomplish this, every real-life college football
player had a unique digital avatar in the video game.9 Although the digital
avatars did not identify the players by name, they possessed the same
identifying attributes, including their playing position and uniform number.10
However, per the NCAA’s rules, EA did not compensate players for its use
of their NIL. In the aftermath of the lawsuits, and much to the dismay of fans,
EA stopped producing NCAA Football in 2013.11 While the circuit courts
ultimately recognized student-athletes’ right to their NIL, the outcomes of
these lawsuits required little to no change on the NCAA’s behalf.12 Simply,
the NCAA’s restrictions remained intact, and student-athletes remained
uncompensated.
Then came NCAA v. Alston,13 a ruling that divested the NCAA of its
antitrust immunity and its “ample latitude” to preserve “the revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports.”14 Following its unanimous defeat at the
Supreme Court, on July 1, 2021, the NCAA adopted an interim policy that
suspended its preexisting NIL restrictions. This allowed intercollegiate
athletes to profit off their NIL in commercial advertisements, sponsorships,
and endorsements.15 The policy, however, did not provide detailed rules or
regulations for states and institutions to enforce.
Prior to the interim policy, in February 2021, EA announced it would
be bringing back the beloved NCAA Football video game franchise as EA
Sports College Football.16 The NCAA’s suspension of its rules against
7. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th
Cir. 2013). Avatars are personalized, graphic representations of real-life persons or users in two or threedimensional forms, commonly as characters in interactive digital games. See Definition – Avatar,
TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/4624/avatar (last updated Aug. 22, 2018).
8. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing, 724 F.3d at 1271.
9. Id.
10. Id. These personal attributes included the same jersey number, home state, height, weight, build,
skin tone, and hair color. Id. Additionally, EA replicates the real-life players’ playing styles and athletic
abilities by sending detailed questionnaires to team equipment managers. Id.
11. Darren Rovell, EA Sports Settles with Ex-Players, ESPN (Sept. 26, 2013),
https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/9728042/ea-sports-stop-producing-college-footballgame; see also Maureen A. Weston, Gamechanger: NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litigation and the Future of College Sports, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 77, 90 (2013) (“In July 2013, the
NCAA announced it would not renew its video game contract with EA Sports, which was set to expire at
the end of 2013.”).
12. See discussion infra Sections III A.1-3.
13. 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021); see also discussion infra Section III A.4.
14. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
15. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image, and Likeness Policy, NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (June 30, 2021, 4:20 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/news/2021/6/30/ncaaadopts-interim-name-image-and-likeness-policy.aspx.
16. Press Release Details – Electronic Arts & CLC to Bring Back College Football Video Games,
ELEC. ARTS, INC. (Feb. 21, 2021), https://ir.ea.com/press-releases/press-release-details/2021/ElectronicArts—CLC-to-Bring-Back-College-Football-Video-Games/default.aspx.
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student-athlete NIL compensation seemingly clears the path for EA’s video
game to feature real-life college football players.17 However, while studentathletes may be signing individual deals, almost every level of the NIL
marketplace faces uncertainty. The NCAA’s failure to implement national
NIL standards created a patchwork of state laws and policies. By deferring
NIL regulations to state legislatures, the NCAA “waived a white flag,”
leaving schools, companies, and student-athletes to navigate through
unsettled state laws in a commercial marketplace coined as the “Wild
West.”18 Ultimately, the lack of uniformity manufactured an uneven playing
field, making it difficult for companies to navigate NIL deals with a host of
student-athletes and for student-athletes to fully capitalize on the
commercialization of their NIL.
To produce EA’s video game, there needs to be a licensing mechanism
for aggregating student-athlete NIL rights across state lines.19 Thus, the
question remains: how can companies seeking to create multi-player product
lines approach licensing with student-athletes in an equitable and efficient
manner under a patchwork of varying state NIL laws? This Note addresses
the challenges posed by the current NIL regulatory scheme and proposes
federal legislation, accompanied by the creation of a third-party licensing
entity, as a solution.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the purpose of the NCAA
and the bylaws impacting student-athletes’ ability to earn compensation for
their NIL, specifically, the NCAA’s long-standing principle of “amateurism”
in intercollegiate sports. Part III examines the relevant litigation challenging
the use of student-athletes’ NIL in EA’s video games under state publicity
law and the NCAA’s restrictions on compensation under federal antitrust
law. This Part will then discuss the subsequent impact of the monumental
legal challenges on the NCAA’s amateurism rules, resulting in the
suspension of NCAA rules prohibiting student-athletes from monetizing
their NIL.
In wake of the newfound NIL policies, Part IV articulates how the lack
of a uniform NIL policy results in a series of inconsistencies between states,
making it difficult for companies to facilitate broad NIL deals for multiplayer product lines. It will address potential licensing mechanisms and the
problems that lie therein, demonstrating the need for NIL reform. Part V
addresses the pressing need for federal legislation to enact a uniform NIL
17. Electronic Arts & CLC to Bring Back College Football Video Games, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210202005894/en/.
18. KC Ifeanyi, How NCAA Athletes Are Taking Creative Control in the Wild West of Name, Image,
Likeness Deals, FAST CO. (Mar. 3, 2022), https://www.fastcompany.com/90725103/ncaa-athletescreative-control-wild-west-name-image-likeness-deals-march-madness.
19. Owen S. Good, NCAA Ruling Means EA Sports Can Pay Real Players to Be in College Football
Game, POLYGON (July 1, 2021, 6:04 PM), https://www.polygon.com/22559909/ncaa-college-footballnil-rules-pay-players-ea-sports-video-game.
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landscape that maximizes the NIL rights of student-athletes and renders
efficiencies for NIL negotiations. After briefly summarizing the current
federal bill proposals, this Part recommends that Congress create an
independent NIL entity to facilitate group licensing in intercollegiate sports.
As will be explained, an independent entity provides the most efficient way
for companies to engage in broad NIL deals with student-athletes while
adhering to the NCAA’s restrictions against unionizing student-athletes and
“pay-for-play.” Finally, returning to EA Sports College Football, Part VI
outlines what EA needs to do to move forward with the revival of its beloved
college football video game franchise, beginning with obtaining licenses for
student-athletes’ NIL rights.

II. THE NCAA AND AMATEURISM
The NCAA is a private, non-profit organization founded in 1906 to
address the need for a uniform set of rules for intercollegiate athletics.20
Today, it is the governing body for college sports, consisting of roughly
1,100 member institutions and over 500,000 student-athletes across 24
sports.21 The NCAA is organized into three divisions based on the university
size, athletic program funding, public appeal, and quality of opportunities
the schools provide student-athletes to participate in collegiate athletics.22
Division I programs consist of the largest student bodies, manage extensive
athletic programs, and are actively involved in most NCAA-related
litigation.23
The NCAA exists to ensure a level playing field in collegiate athletic
competitions and to administer championships.24 Its basic purpose is “to
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so
doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports.”25 To this end, the NCAA has historically enforced an
“amateurism” policy,26 which states: “[s]tudent athletes shall be amateurs in

20. History,
NAT’L
COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC
ASS’N,
https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/5/4/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
21. Overview,
NAT’L
COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC
ASS’N,
https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/16/overview.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Overview, supra note 21.
25. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2021-22 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 1.3.1, at 1 (2021),
https://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D122.pdf [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
26. In 2010, the NCAA punished the University of Southern California (USC) for violations made
by former football player Reggie Bush (i.e., the greatest college football player of all time). See NCAA
Delivers Postseason Football Ban, ESPN (June 10, 2010), https://www.espn.com/losangeles/ncf/news/story?id=5272615. After a multi-year investigation, the NCAA concluded that Bush
accepted more than $100,000 of “improper benefits” from agents, as prohibited by the NCAA’s
amateurism rules. Id. Despite its lack of involvement, the NCAA sanctioned USC with four years’
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an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily
by education and by the physical, mental, and social benefits to be derived.
Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and studentathletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises.”27
In furtherance of this policy, the NCAA’s bylaws limited the amount of
compensation that a student-athlete may receive for their participation in
intercollegiate athletics.28 Among other things, these prohibitions extended
to bar student-athletes from earning income off their NIL.29 Specifically,
Bylaw 12.5.2.1 dictated that student-athletes could not accept compensation
for the use of their name or picture to directly advertise, recommend, or
promote the sale or use of a commercial product or service, or receive
compensation for promoting a commercial product or service.30 Under these
rules, student-athletes possessed no right to use their NIL for commercial
purposes.
The NCAA, however, retained the exclusive right to use student-athlete
NIL to promote NCAA championships, events, activities, or programs.31 As
a prerequisite for eligibility, the NCAA required student-athletes to sign the
Form 08-3a “Student Athlete Statement” prior to competing in
intercollegiate athletics.32 Part IV of the form expressly authorized the
NCAA and Collegiate Licensing Committee (“CLC”) to use their NIL in
accordance with Bylaw 12.5.33 By signing, student-athletes relinquished all
rights in the NCAA’s use of their NIL. Consequently, the bylaws set forth
that NCAA student-athletes are prohibited from using their own NIL for
commercial gain, while the NCAA itself

probation, a loss of thirty scholarships over three years, a two-year bowl ban, and vacated fourteen wins
from the 2004 and 2005 seasons, including its 2004 National Championship title. Id.
27. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 25, § 2.9, at 3.
28. See generally id. § 12.1, at 62-68.
29. Id. § 12.5.2.1, at 77. An individual’s NIL makes up the legal concept known as the “right of
publicity,” or the right of the individual to control the commercial use of one’s identity. See NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NAME, IMAGE AND LIKENESS POLICY – QUESTION AND ANSWER 1
(2021), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/NIL/NIL_QandA.pdf.
30. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 25, § 12.5.2.1, at 77.
31. See id. § 12.5.1.1, at 74 (“[a]n institution or recognized entity thereof . . . a conference or a
noninstitutional charitable, educational or nonprofit agency may use a student-athlete’s name, picture or
appearance to support its charitable or educational activities or to support activities considered incidental
to the student-athlete’s participation in intercollegiate athletics”).
32. NCAA, FORM 08-3A, NCAA DIVISION I STUDENT-ATHLETE STATEMENT 1 (2011),
https://www.liberty.edu/media/1912/compliance/newformsdec2010/currentflames/compliance/SA%20S
tatement%20Form.pdf.
33. Id. at 4 (“You authorize the NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host
institution, conference, local organizing committee)] to use your name or picture to generally promote
NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs.”).
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III. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND FOR STUDENT-ATHLETE NIL
The NCAA justified its restrictions against student-athlete
compensation by citing the need to protect student-athletes from commercial
exploitation and to preserve the “sanctity” of intercollegiate sports.34 For
decades, courts displayed a degree of deference to the NCAA and its selfdefined principles of amateurism. However, as this Part demonstrates, recent
decisions signaled a shift in the tides. Section A examines the litigation
surrounding student-athletes’ fight for their NIL rights under previously
enforced Division I NCAA bylaws. Section B picks up where Section A
leaves off, summarizing the current state of student-athlete NIL rights and
compensation.
A. LITIGATION UNDER PREVIOUS NIL POLICIES
The NCAA is no stranger to litigation regarding the validity and
enforceability of its amateurism rules. Historically, most litigation focused
on allegations that the NCAA’s rules violate antitrust laws.35 Over time,
current and former student-athletes fought for their right to compensation,
making progress through the following noteworthy cases, presented in the
sequence in which they were decided.
1. Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
In 2009, Samuel Keller, a former quarterback for Arizona State
University (ASU) and the University of Nebraska, sued the NCAA, EA, and
the CLC in the Northern District of California, alleging that the defendants’
use of his NIL in NCAA Football video games constituted a commercial
misappropriation of his likeness without his consent or payment.36
Keller addressed whether EA had a First Amendment defense against
Keller’s right-of-publicity claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.37
Applying the “transformative use” test developed by the California Supreme
Court,38 the Ninth Circuit determined39 EA’s digital avatars lacked
34. See Laura Freedman, Note, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA Amateurism
Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 675-76 (2003).
35. Notable antitrust cases include NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) and In re NCAA
1-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
36. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
Keller claimed that the video game’s virtual avatars were “nearly identical to their real-life counterparts:
they share the same jersey numbers, have similar characteristics and come from the same home state.”
Id. at *1.
37. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1272 (9th Cir.
2013); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 425.16.
38. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 391 (2001) (defining the
transformative use test as “a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based
on whether the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed into something
more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”).
39. EA appealed the district court’s ruling denying its motion to dismiss. See In re NCAA StudentAthlete Name & Likeness Licensing, 724 F.3d at 1284.
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significant transformative elements because the characters are represented as
exact depictions of real-life student-athletes doing exactly what they do as
college football players.40 Consequently, the appellate court held that “EA’s
use of the likenesses of college athletes like Samuel Keller in its video games
[was] not, as a matter of law, protected by the First Amendment.”41 Keller
thus held that the First Amendment has limits as a defense in video games
where the likeness of another is used without their permission. In the context
of student-athletes, Keller established that video game developers must
obtain permission from the student-athletes to use their NIL.42
2. Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
Around the same time as Keller, Ryan Hart, a former football player at
Rutgers University, sued EA in the District of New Jersey, alleging that EA
violated his publicity rights by misappropriating and incorporating his NIL
for commercial purposes in its NCAA Football video games.43
The district court granted EA’s motion for summary judgment, holding
that the First Amendment barred Hart’s right of publicity claim because EA’s
right to free expression outweighed Hart’s right of publicity.44 The court
reasoned that, because the game permits users to alter the virtual avatar’s
physical characteristics, the malleability of the real-life player’s image
served as an “art imitating-life starting point for the game playing
experience.”45 As such, EA sufficiently passed muster under the
transformative use test.46
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that EA’s use of Hart’s likeness in
its video games failed the transformative use test.47 The appellate court
concluded that a user’s ability to alter a player’s digital avatar is insufficient
to override the fact that Hart’s digital avatar is the default character within
the game, and it is the heightened realism of the avatars that draws users to

40. Id. at 1284; see also No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1034 (2011)
(“[T]hat the avatars appear in the context of a videogame that contains many other creative elements[ ]
does not transform the avatars into anything other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing
exactly what they do as celebrities.”).
41. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing, 724 F.3d at 1284.
42. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA BOARD OF GOVERNORS FEDERAL AND STATE
LEGISLATION WORKING GROUP FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 11 (2020),
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/committees/ncaa/wrkgrps/fslwg/Apr2020FSLWG_Report.pdf
[hereinafter NCAA REPORT].
43. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (D.N.J. 2011).
44. Id. at 794.
45. Id. at 787.
46. Id. Addressing Keller, the Hart court commented that Keller “fail[ed] to address that the virtual
image may be altered and that the EA artists created the various formulations of each player.” Id.
47. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 166 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The digital Ryan Hart does what
the actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recreations of college
football stadiums, filled with all the trappings of a college football game.”).
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playing the game.48 Because the video game failed to alter or transform
Hart’s identity in any meaningful way, EA did not sufficiently transform
Hart’s likeness to amount to an expressive work.49
3. O’Bannon v. NCAA
Keller and Hart concerned publicity rights claims under state law.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n broadened the scope of legal
challenges that could be brought against the NCAA by challenging the
NCAA’s restrictions on student-athletes’ publicity rights under federal
antitrust law.50
In 2009, Ed O’Bannon, a former basketball player for the University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA), sued EA, the NCAA, and the CLC in the
Northern District of California after recognizing himself as a digital avatar
in EA’s NCAA Basketball 2009 video game.51 O’Bannon joined with thencurrent and former NCAA men’s football and basketball players to challenge
the NCAA’s amateurism rules and attack its use of players’ images in video
games.52 The court considered whether, in the absence of the NCAA’s
prohibition on student-athletes profiting off their NIL, student-athletes
would have profited from the use of their NIL in EA’s video games.53 The
district court held that the NCAA’s prohibition against student-athletes
accepting compensation beyond the limitations of grant-in-aid scholarships54
unreasonably restrained their right to license their NIL in a group license to
videogame developers.55 Specifically, the use of student-athletes’ NIL
“increased the attractiveness of college sports video games to consumers,
creating a demand for players’ NILs.”56 Absent the NCAA’s prohibitions,
“[v]ideogame developers would seek to acquire group licenses to use the
names, images, and likenesses of FBS football and Division I basketball
players” if players could receive compensation for such licenses.57
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs were
“injured in fact as a result of the NCAA’s rules having foreclosed the market

48. Id. at 168.
49. Id. at 170.
50. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2014). For much of their time in court, Keller and O’Bannon
were consolidated as In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. (“Keller”), 724
F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). In June 2014, O’Bannon and Keller were deconsolidated, and the antitrust
claims against the NCAA at issue in O’Bannon went to trial in the Northern District of California. See
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2015).
51. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
52. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 962.
53. Id. at 965.
54. “Grant-in-aid” is defined as “financial aid that consists of tuition and fees, room and board, and
required course-related books.” Id. at 971.
55. Id. at 968.
56. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1057.
57. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 970.
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for their NILs in video games.”58 The appellate court noted that “the NCAA’s
rules [had] been more restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition of
amateurism,” but it nevertheless held that preserving amateurism had
procompetitive benefits, and distinguished between payments tied to
educationally-related activities and those unrelated.59
As a secondary matter, the Ninth Circuit declined to answer whether the
Copyright Act preempted plaintiffs’ publicity rights in video games, labeling
the issue as “tangential” and “irrelevant.”60 It noted that, under “the NCAA’s
interpretation of the Copyright Act, professional football and basketball
players have no enforceable right-of-publicity claims against video game
makers either—yet EA currently pays NFL and NBA players for the right to
use their NILs in its video games.”61 Thus, the appellate court reasoned that
“there is every reason to believe that, if permitted to do so, EA or another
video game company would pay NCAA athletes for their NIL rights rather
than test the enforceability of those rights in court.”62
Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon, EA paid a $60
million settlement to the aggregate plaintiff class of more than 100,000
student-athletes.63 The named plaintiffs—Ed O’Bannon, Ryan Hart, and
Sam Keller—received the most money, estimated to be around $15,000
each.64 The lawsuit ultimately resulted in the discontinuation of the college
sports video game franchise, making NCAA Football 2014 the last version
produced.65
O’Bannon provided landmark precedent for student-athlete
compensation. The Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that video games
depicting student-athletes’ NIL require licenses to those student-athletes’
NIL rights. On its face, this proved a “win” for student-athletes—but when
applied, it required no changes to the NCAA’s NIL policies.66 From a legal
standpoint, the NCAA’s regulations against player compensation held sound
following O’Bannon. Nevertheless, the NCAA’s policies on player
compensation soon met greater opposition, forcing the NCAA to reevaluate
its amateurism rules.
58. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1067.
59. Id. at 1079.
60. Id. at 1068.
61. Id. at 1069.
62. Id.
63. EA issued a single settlement for all three cases (i.e., Keller, Hart, and O’Bannon) to college
football and basketball players whose NIL appeared in EA’s college sports video games from 2003
through 2014. See Darren Rovell, Athletes Whose Likenesses Appeared in Electronic Arts Games Will
Share a $60 Million Settlement, ESPN (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.espn.com/collegesports/story/_/id/14980599/college-football-basketball-players-receive-average-1600-settlementelectronic-arts.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Carly Sirota, How the States and the NCAA Are Changing the Landscape of Collegiate Name,
Image, and Likeness Compensation, 24 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 9 (2019).
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4. NCAA v. Alston
O’Bannon established that student-athletes could use federal antitrust
law to “prove” that there are better ways of preserving amateurism than
current NCAA rules. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston went a step
further, addressing whether the NCAA’s compensation eligibility rules
violated federal antitrust law.67 Although Alston focused more on the
NCAA’s compensation limitations itself, it implicates intellectual property
rights that student-athletes may have in their NIL. The Supreme Court’s
unanimous decision sent waves into the intercollegiate sports landscape by
sending the NCAA a warning that any attempts to restrict NIL activities
could be viewed as violations of federal antitrust law.68
In 2014, a class of then-current and former Division I student-athletes
(collectively, “Alston”) filed a class action lawsuit against the NCAA in the
Northern District of California, challenging the NCAA’s compensation
system.69 The student-athletes alleged that the NCAA’s restrictions on the
non-cash education-related benefits70 that colleges may offer studentathletes violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.71 Applying federal antitrust law’s
“rule of reason” analysis,72 the district court held that the NCAA’s rules
limits on education-related benefits unreasonably constrained trade.73 At the
same time, however, the district court concluded that the NCAA could limit
cash or cash-equivalent awards for non-academic purposes, finding that
limits on compensation unrelated to education did not violate the Sherman
Act.74 Nonetheless, the court issued a permanent injunction that the NCAA
make its compensation rules less restrictive for student-athletes.75 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and the injunction took effect
in August 2020.76
67. 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
68. Id. at 2144.
69. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d
1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
70. See id. at 1088 (defining education-related benefits as “computers, science equipment, musical
instruments and other items not currently included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless
related to the pursuit of various academic studies.”).
71. Id. at 1062.
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 4302. The “rule of reason” analysis is used for determining whether a restraint
is undue for purposes of the Sherman Act. Under this standard, a defendant’s restraint on competition
violates the test if the practice’s harm to competition outweighs its procompetitive effects. Courts
typically analyze this balancing standard under a burden-shifting framework, requiring the plaintiff to
show the restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market before turning to
the defendant to produce evidence of the restraint’s procompetitive effects. f it reaches this point, the
court will only find against the restraint if the plaintiff shows that any legitimate objectives can be
achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985.
73. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1062.
74. Id. at 1109.
75. Id. at 1110.
76. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239,
1244 (9th Cir. 2020).
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The NCAA appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that its
compensation rules should be reviewed deferentially if some justification for
its procompetitive restraints can be provided.77 The NCAA asserted that
amateurism is essential to the “product” offered by the NCAA—being
amateur college sports—and that its procompetitive activity preserves that
product.78 From the NCAA’s standpoint, its amateurism rules should be
upheld because they are designed to maintain the character of amateur
college sports.79
The Court held that the district court properly applied the “rule of
reason” in determining that the NCAA’s enjoined rules were unlawful
restraints of trade under the Sherman Act.80 Under the “rule of reason”
analysis, the student-athletes carried their burden by showing that the
restraints produced significant anticompetitive effects, that only some of the
challenged NCAA rules served the procompetitive purpose of preserving
amateurism, and any legitimate objectives could be achieved in a
substantially less restrictive manner.81 Subsequently, the Court upheld the
injunction prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing its rules limiting educationrelated benefits that conferences and schools may provide to studentathletes.82 However, the Court permitted the NCAA to continue to limit cash
awards for academic achievement, but only if those limits are no lower than
the cash awards currently allowed for athletic achievement.83
Alston addressed the legality of the NCAA’s restraints on studentathlete compensation under the Sherman Act—yet the Court’s ruling
extended beyond the realm of antitrust law. While the Court narrowly
focused on “education-related benefits,” the subject-matter drew scrutiny to
the NCAA’s amateurism rules as a whole. Thus, the practical effect of Alston
left the NCAA with two options: modify its amateurism rules or remove
them altogether. As Section B reveals, the NCAA took a slightly different
approach.
B. THE MODERN STATE OF STUDENT-ATHLETE NIL
Backed into a corner, the NCAA took action. On June 30, 2021,
following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alston, all three NCAA divisions
adopted a uniform, interim policy that suspended the NCAA’s amateurism
rules prohibiting student-athletes from monetizing the commercial use of
their NIL.84 The NCAA’s Interim NIL Policy is as follows:
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2155 (2021).
Id. at 2157.
Id. at 2158.
Id. at 2144.
Id. at 2162.
Id. at 2144.
Id. at 2164-65.
Hosick, supra note 15.

Winter 2023

EA SPORTS: IT'S IN THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION

87

[E]ffective July 1, 2021, and until such time that either federal legislation or
new NCAA rules are adopted, member institutions and their student-athletes
should adhere to the guidance below:
1. NCAA Bylaws, including prohibitions on pay-for-play and improper
recruiting inducements, remain in effect, subject to the following:
•

For institutions in states without NIL laws or executive actions or
with NIL laws or executive actions that have not yet taken effect, if
an individual elects to engage in an NIL activity, the individual’s
eligibility for intercollegiate athletics will not be impacted by
application of Bylaw 12 (Amateurism and Athletics Eligibility).

•

For institutions in states with NIL laws or executive actions with the
force of law in effect, if an individual or member institution elects to
engage in an NIL activity that is protected by law or executive order,
the individual’s eligibility for and/or the membership institution’s
full participation in NCAA athletics will not be impacted by
application of NCAA Bylaws unless the state law is invalidated or
rendered unenforceable by operation of law.

•

Use of a professional services provider is also permissible for NIL
activities, except as otherwise provided by a state law or executive
action with the force of law that has not been invalidated or rendered
unenforceable by operation of law.

2. The NCAA will continue its normal regulatory operations but will not
monitor for compliance with state law.
3. Individuals should report NIL activities consistent with state law and/or
institutional requirements.85

State recognition of student-athlete NIL rights quickly unfolded, and a
multitude of states enacted NIL statutes outlining the procedures and
limitations for student-athletes to license their NIL.86 To date, twenty-nine
states have passed NIL legislation—with twenty-four laws currently in effect
and the remainder scheduled to take effect by July 1, 2023—and at least
another ten states with proposed or pending legislation.87 Schools and
85. NAT’L
COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC
ASS’N,
INTERIM
NIL
POLICY
(2021),
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/NIL/NIL_InterimPolicy.pdf.
86. W. Drew Kastner & Monica P. Matias, Name, Image & Likeness (NIL): Three Key Legal Issues
Facing Businesses in College Athlete Endorsement Deals to Date, MARTINDALE (Dec. 29, 2021),
https://www.martindale.com/legal-news/article_schnader-harrison-segal-lewis-llp_2552576.htm.
87. See, e.g., Christopher P. Conniff et al., NCAA NIL Update: With a Semester of NIL Opportunities
in the Books, Trends Emerge and Confusion Reigns, ROPES & GRAY (Mar. 1, 2022),
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2022/March/NCAA-NIL-Update-With-a-Semester-of-
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student-athletes in states with NIL legislation are governed by state law,
subject to the NCAA’s rules against pay-for-play and impermissible
inducements.88 For states without NIL laws, schools and student-athletes are
subject only to the NCAA’s interim NIL policy.89
The NCAA interim policy eliminated the restriction on student-athletes
earning compensation for NIL but did not implement consistent NIL norms
or rules.90 Under the interim policy, some opportunities will be restricted,
but the types of restrictions will vary based on state laws and policies created
by individual schools. In January 2022, the NCAA decided to adopt a new
constitution, which included no fundamental revisions to the interim NIL
policy.91 As a result of the lack of federal law, NCAA NIL rules, and NCAA
enforcement precedent under the interim policy, NIL activities and limits
differ widely by state and institution. The NCAA interim policy will remain
in place until new NCAA rules or federal legislation is adopted.92

IV. COLLEGE ATHLETES CAN PROFIT OFF THEIR NIL: NOW
WHAT?
It’s a new era for intercollegiate athletics. For the first time in NCAA
history, student-athletes may permissibly commercialize their NIL rights—
and in the months since the NCAA suspended its amateurism rules, the NIL
marketplace continues to flourish. However, the largest opportunities with
participation by major companies have yet to unfold.93 The problem isn’t that
most companies lack the financial ability to pay student-athletes for the use
of their NIL, or that athletes lack the right to license their NIL. Rather, the
problem is how to orchestrate broad NIL deals in an efficient and equitable
manner.
The NCAA enacted an interim policy that opened a new market for
NIL, but implemented no national standard governing NIL activities, leaving
much of the NIL landscape open to interpretation.94 While this proved a
NIL-Opportunities-in-the-Books-Trends-Emerge-and-Confusion-Reigns; Ezzat Nsouli & Andrew King,
How US Federal and State Legislatures Have Addressed NIL, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (July 13, 2022),
https://www.sports.legal/2022/07/how-us-federal-and-state-legislatures-have-addressed-nil/.
88. Conniff et al., supra note 87.
89. Id.
90. INTERIM NIL POLICY, supra note 85.
91. Corbin McGuire, NCAA Members Approve New Constitution, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASS’N (Jan. 20, 2022, 6:12 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/news/2022/1/20/media-center-ncaa-membersapprove-new-constitution.aspx.
92. INTERIM NIL POLICY, supra note 85.
93. Darren Heitner, Group Licensing Is Starting to Take Shape for College Athlete NIL Deals,
OUTKICK (July 22, 2021), https://www.outkick.com/group-licensing-is-starting-to-take-shape-forcollege-athlete-nil-deals/.
94. See Brooks Pierce & Noah Hock, Navigating the Uncertain Terrain of NIL Deals for Student
Athletes, JD SUPRA (Dec. 3, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/navigating-the-uncertain-terrainof-nil-1728873/. This Note will not dissect the differences between NIL state laws, rather it will discuss
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substantial step, the NCAA and a patchwork of state NIL laws still pose a
hurdle for companies seeking a widespread aggregation of student-athlete
NIL and for student-athletes hoping to maximize their earning potential for
products like EA Sports College Football. This Note discusses three
licensing models and their respective problems, specifically focusing on how
each impacts the facilitation of broad, multi-player NIL deals. Individual
licensing, co-branding, and group licensing are discussed in Sections A
through C below.
A. INDIVIDUAL LICENSING AND NIL VALUATION
Individually licensing with a large population often involves high
transactional costs in the expense and time required to directly identify,
locate, and negotiate agreements with each person.95 While these burdens are
somewhat “expected,” the current intercollegiate NIL landscape poses an
additional “complication” when it comes to licensing with student-athletes:
how can companies determine the value of an individual student-athlete’s
NIL for use in multi-player product lines? Notably, some states96 require—
or give colleges the discretion to require—that any compensation received
by student-athletes in exchange for their NIL correspond with fair market
value.97 “Fair market value” is generally defined as the price currently
offered for an asset (e.g., NIL rights) in an open and competitive
marketplace.98 The fair market value of an asset can generally be determined
by the price on which other buyers and sellers have agreed upon in similar
negotiations, and the value they yielded in the past.99
Determining what “fair market value” means in the context of studentathlete NIL may be controversial. The novelty of student-athlete NIL
compensation, and the limited number of previous dealings for large-scale
product lines, results in a lack of data available for a market approach to

specific components of NIL state laws to demonstrate the inconsistencies which may require further
legislation or updated NCAA policies to alleviate.
95. See Amber Jorgensen, Why Collegiate Athletes Could Have the NCAA, et al. Singing a Different
Tune, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 392 (2015).
96. States with mandated restrictions include Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi, while North
Carolina defers to individual colleges. See FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, NATIONWIDE NAME, IMAGE, AND
LIKENESS (“NIL”) TRACKER: A COMPENDIUM OF COLLEGE SPORTS NIL LAWS IN THE U.S. 1, 6-7 (2022),
https://www.foley.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2022/04/nationwide—nil—tracker22mc38248aprilv2.pdf?la=en.
97. For example, Florida’s NIL law requires that compensation earned by college athletes must
correspond with the fair market value of the authorized use of their NIL, whereas California’s NIL law
omits the term “market value,” or any similar term, from its language. Compare S.B. 646, 2020 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2020), with S.B. 206, 2019 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
98. James Chen, Fair Market Value (FMV): Definition and How to Calculate It, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fairmarketvalue.asp (last updated July 1, 2022). This value
measures what informed parties, acting in their own interest with ample time to decide, would pay in such
a transaction. Id.
99. Id.
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valuation. In theory, valuation could be based on the factors currently
utilized for most sponsorship and endorsement deals, thus providing some
data available from existing arrangements.100 However, the use of a player’s
NIL for integration into products isn’t for sponsorship or endorsement
purposes. Interested companies seek to obtain licenses for the right to use
student-athlete NIL in the creation of their products, forming a marketplace
outside the realm of commercial endorsements. Consequently, there is no
straightforward financial model for determining whether a student-athlete’s
compensation is commensurate with “fair market value” to guide companies
looking to facilitate broad NIL deals, as the marketplace is largely untested
in intercollegiate sports.
As a result of these inconsistencies, licensing agreements can vary
widely in the compensation offered because each agreement is unique to the
rules and regulations of the student-athlete’s state and school.101 For
instance, student-athletes at schools in states without applicable NIL state
laws are bound only to the NCAA’s interim policy, which makes no
reference to fair market value or similar “caps” on compensation.102
Similarly, student-athletes in states like California—whose NIL laws
exclude “fair market value”—are not bound by policies requiring their NIL
compensation to commensurate with fair market value.103 Negotiating
agreements in these states is more beneficial to star players and third parties
alike, as companies will have greater discretion when it comes to structuring
NIL deals and these student-athletes have the potential to earn more money.
Conversely, in states dictating that student-athlete compensation must
correspond with fair market value, a star player’s compensation may be
lower than it would be if they played at a school in a state without “fair
market value” limitations.
States requiring that student-athlete NIL compensation be
commensurate with “fair market value” create unnecessary ambiguities.
Because the “market value of an asset can be defined as whatever the current
100. See Patrick Rishe, NIL Earnings: The Factors Impacting How Much a College Athlete Can Make
from
Endorsements,
FORBES
(July
4,
2021,
8:22
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2021/07/04/nil-earnings-the-factors-impacting-how-much-acollege-athlete-can-make-from-endorsements/?sh=7b27c9ac75dd. Though there is no rigid formula, NIL
valuation is generally based on the following factors:
1.The student-athlete’s athletic performance and accomplishments.
2.The size and quality of the student-athlete’s social media presence and following.
3.The quality of brand management surrounding the student-athlete.
4.The size and financial ability of the student’s university and athletics department, and their ability
to offer branding mentorship.
5.The “market size” of the city where the student-athlete’s school is located.
6.The NIL rules for the state, school, or conference that the student-athlete competes in.
7.The student-athlete’s sport.
101. See Pierce & Hock, supra note 94.
102. INTERIM NIL POLICY, supra note 85.
103. See generally S.B. 206, 2019 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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price is for that product in the marketplace,” whatever someone is willing to
pay for the use of a student-athlete’s NIL is the market value and, by
definition, a “fair” price.104 Notably, in states both with and without laws
requiring fair market value, the compensation offered to lesser-known
student-athletes may be negatively impacted by the lack of valuation
guidelines, as their “worth” will be dictated by a company’s negotiating
powers.105 Without uniformity across the NIL landscape, it is not possible to
have one standard applicable to all student-athletes, making equity
unachievable.
B. THE BAR AGAINST CO-LICENSING AND CO-BRANDING
Much like the varying restrictions on compensation, many states
prohibit—or give colleges the discretion to prohibit—student-athletes from
using their school’s intellectual property (e.g., institutional logos and marks)
in NIL activities.106 “Co-branding,” also known as “co-licensing,” is a
derivative of individual NIL rights that, in the intercollegiate context, allows
student-athletes and schools “to combine the market strength, brand
awareness, positive associations, and cachet of two or more brands to compel
consumers to pay a greater premium for them.”107 Such an arrangement is a
form of group licensing, wherein “all college athletes in that sport would
receive an equal share of revenue” from product sales.108 By maximizing the
value of complementary intellectual property rights, co-branding “reduces
the potential for individual [intellectual property] holders to exploit
bargaining power advantages in licensing negotiations.”109
While many schools and states are reluctant to permit athletes access to
utilize school intellectual property, others have enacted open policies to
facilitate these opportunities. Among the first to do so was the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC).110 UNC partnered with The Brandr
104. Timothy Winkler, The End of an Error: Reforming the NCAA Through Legislation, 90 UMKC
L. REV. 219, 243 (2021).
105. Bob Wallace, Jr. & Matthew Misichko, A Look at Recent Student Athlete Name, Image and
Likeness
Legislation,
THOMPSON
COBURN
LLP
(July
7,
2020),
https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/publications/item/2020-07-07/a-look-at-recent-studentathlete-name-image-and-likeness-legislation.
106. States with laws prohibiting a student-athletes from using college intellectual property in NIL
dealings include Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. States that give colleges
the discretion to make this determination include Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Montana, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. See FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 96.
107. Will
Kenton,
Co-Branding,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cobranding.asp (last updated June 19, 2020).
108. NIL FAQS: Group Licensing, KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS,
https://www.knightcommission.org/nil-faqs-group-licensing/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
109. Jeffrey F. Brown et al., A Proposal for Group Licensing of College Athlete NILs, 12 HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 15 (2021).
110. UNC and The Brandr Launch Group Licensing Program for Current Student-Athletes, U.N.C.
CHAPEL HILL ATHLETICS (July 20, 2021), https://goheels.com/news/2021/7/20/general-unc-and-thebrandr-launch-group-licensing-program-for-current-student-athletes.aspx.
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Group (“Brandr”) to invite “all of UNC’s current student-athletes to join a
voluntary group licensing program, which will allow them to benefit from
their NIL in conjunction with UNC’s official trademarks and logos.”111
Through this program, companies can orchestrate three or more studentathletes’ NIL into products featuring UNC’s logos, such as t-shirts with
players’ names and numbers on them.112 However, for states and schools
without permissive laws or policies, student-athletes and schools are barred
from striking such “joint licensing” deals,113 meaning that products featuring
both institutional intellectual property and student-athlete NIL are
prohibited.114 This limits the pool of student-athletes who could benefit from
the new NIL policies because lesser-known athletes may depend on the
association with their respective institution to secure NIL opportunities.115
Relevant here, the varying laws pose a challenge for licensees looking
to create products that combine school intellectual property and studentathlete NIL. For example, EA’s college football video games “feature teams
from a majority of the Division I schools, simulating intercollegiate
competition” between teams and their respective players.116 To obtain the
rights to use schools’ intellectual property in its video games, EA negotiates
a license with the CLC and its affiliate teams.117 The digital avatars—
designed to depict real student-athletes—wear uniforms featuring their
school’s institutional marks. Given the digital nature of EA’s product, it is
uncertain whether licensing with student-athletes for use of their NIL in
conjunction with teams’ intellectual property runs afoul to such rules.
To create EA Sports College Football, it is likely that co-branding
between student-athletes’ NIL and schools’ intellectual property is required.
However, because EA’s college football video games feature a selection of
schools from different states, co-branding may not be permitted by every
111. Id.
112. See id. (“Carolina fans can own merchandise and other products featuring their school’s logo
and the names and numbers of their favorite Tar Heels.”).
113. In addition to the restrictions created by state laws, the NCAA views the use of institutional
marks in conjunction with student-athlete NIL deals as creating a “joint deal” wherein the schools are
directly paying student-athletes in violation of its rules against “pay-for-play.” See LEAD1 Association,
LEAD1 Forum: Group Licensing -Now, Later, or Never? The Debate Continues…, YOUTUBE (Oct. 12,
2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mvoaVwM0EkQ&t=8s. This Note does not examine the
separate issue of “pay-for-play,” rather the issue is mentioned here to provide further context surrounding
the NCAA’s concerns with co-branding and group licensing.
114. Alex Kirshner, How College Athletes Are Making ‘Massive Decisions’ in the NIL Era, GLOB.
SPORTS MATTERS (Dec. 7, 2021), https://globalsportmatters.com/business/2021/12/07/college-athletesmassive-decisions-nil-era/.
115. Taylor P. Thompson, Maximizing NIL Rights for College Athletes, 107 IOWA L. REV. 1347, 1383
(2022); see generally Jeremy M. Evans, Student-Athlete Brands in the Age of Name, Image, and Likeness,
A.B.A.
(Dec.
1,
2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/202021/november-december/student-athlete-brands-age-name-image-likeness/.
116. Weston, supra note 11.
117. See Press Release Details, supra note 16.
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team. In the absence of national guidelines for the use of student-athlete NIL
in conjunction with school intellectual property, certain teams may lose the
opportunity to be included in EA Sports College Football.
C. A “TEAM” WITHOUT GROUP LICENSING
It is most efficient for companies to negotiate one deal for a bundle of
student-athletes’ NIL rights via group licensing. An NIL group licensing deal
would consist of student-athletes pooling their NIL rights together and
licensing them collectively as a group to third parties interested using the
players’ NIL in connection with its product (e.g., video games). Through
this, group licensing maximizes the value of complementary intellectual
property rights and “reduces the potential for individual [intellectual
property] holders to exploit bargaining power advantages in licensing
negotiations.”118 Ultimately, group licensing facilitates “one-stop shopping”
for student-athletes’ NIL rights while maximizing student-athletes’ earning
potential by creating arrangements that otherwise would not be tenable
absent group licensing.119
Herein lies the challenge for companies and student-athletes hoping to
participate in centralized NIL group licensing deals: the NCAA remains
adamant against the group licensing and co-branding of student-athlete NIL.
In a report released by the NCAA Board of Governors on April 17, 2020, the
NCAA outlined its recommendations on NIL regulations.120 As part of its
considerations, a designated “working-group” addressed the possibility of
group licensing approach for student-athlete NIL under the models used in
professional sports settings.121 The group concluded that group licensing
programs in professional sports benefit from legal structures “unavailable”
to the NCAA and its member schools.122 More specifically, it noted that the
NCAA lacks a players’ union to serve as a bargaining unit for the athletes.123
From the NCAA’s perspective, a group licensing agreement may push the
NCAA too close to an employee-employer relationship with its studentathletes because group licensing typically occurs by means of a players’
union.124 This “employee debate” is the primary root of the NCAA’s
resistance to grant group licenses.125
118. Brown et al., supra note 109.
119. NIL FAQS, supra note 108.
120. NCAA REPORT, supra note 42, at 1.
121. Id. The NCAA Board of Governors created the Federal and State Legislation Working Group in
2019 to investigate possible responses to proposed state and federal legislation regarding the commercial
use of student-athlete NIL. Id.
122. Id. at 7.
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id.
125. This Note acknowledges that there is a broader question concerning whether student athletes
should be considered employees. In limiting the discussion to the intellectual property and legislative
concerns surrounding NIL, this Note does not attempt to tackle issues of employment law.

94

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

45:1

The NCAA’s stance against group licensing poses yet another potential
roadblock for student-athletes, especially those athletes who are not wellknown enough to reap the benefits of their NIL rights outside of a group
environment. However, the NCAA is misinformed, as group licensing can,
and does, exist within the confines of the association’s rules.
The NCAA operates under the assumption that such agreements would
create a players’ union, thus labeling student-athletes as “professional
athletes.” Contrary to this belief, unless institutions directly pay studentathletes to play their sport, student-athletes working together on a business
opportunity does not turn them into professional athletes.126 That is, there
does not need to be a players’ union to reap the benefits of a collective group
rights licensing program: there need only exist a third-party entity to
facilitate and execute group licensing deals.
Commercial group licensing agencies are popping up across the
country, with structures and strategic partnerships in place to mimic the role
of a legislative entity. Of those agencies, OneTeam Partners (“OneTeam”) is
well known for representing the commercial business interests of several
professional players’ associations.127 OneTeam negotiates the group
licensing rights of professional athletes in product categories like video
games, trading cards, merchandise, and more by maximizing the collective
value of their NIL rights.128 In 2021, OneTeam announced the creation of its
group licensing program for college athletes, extending its expertise and
group licensing services to intercollegiate sports.129
Around the same time the NCAA updated its NIL policies, OneTeam
established partnerships with other major platforms in the NIL market, each
of which offers specialization in a particular area therein. For example,
OneTeam joined forces with Opendorse to implement a tech-based way to
deliver group licensing opportunities to collegiate athletes via Opendorse’s
“Deals” athlete marketplace.130 To determine fair market value, OneTeam
partnered with INFLCR for valuation software based in data collected from
schools and social media metrics.131 For guidance on NIL compliance,
126. THE DRAKE GROUP, CRITICISM OF APRIL 29 NCAA BOARD OF GOVERNORS’ GUIDELINES FOR
FUTURE NCAA AND FEDERAL NIL LEGISLATION 4 (May 11, 2020), https://www.thedrakegroup.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/May-8-NCAA-NIL-Position.pdf.
127. See ONETEAM, https://joinoneteam.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
128. Welcome to College Athlete Group Licensing, ONETEAM, https://joinoneteam.com/gla.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2022).
129. See Emily Caron, OneTeam, Opendorse Deal to Bring Group Licensing to College Athletes,
YAHOO! (June 29, 2021), https://www.yahoo.com/video/oneteam-partners-opendorse-bring-group130046734.html.
130. Opendorse provides technology to the athlete endorsement and sponsorship industry. See About,
OPENDORSE, https://opendorse.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2022). The company provides services
to support athletes, including “educating, assessing, planning, sharing, creating, measuring, tracking,
disclosing, regulating, listing, browsing, booking, and more.” Id.
131. Karen Weaver, Determining an Athlete’s Fair Market Value Is the Next Hurdle for NIL Rights.
These Two Companies Could Solve That, FORBES (May 25, 2021, 8:30 AM),
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OneTeam also partnered with Altius Sports Partners, an NIL advisory and
education firm, to provide consulting services to student-athletes and
schools.132 Finally, OneTeam invested a significant amount into Brandr,133
bolstering OneTeam’s access to schools and student-athletes via Brandr’s
expansive client roster and group marketing services.134 These partnerships
demonstrate OneTeam’s ability to provide “full package” services for NIL
group licensing opportunities.
Notably, OneTeam has already succeeded in orchestrating multi-player
NIL deals. In July 2021, Panini America announced an exclusive, multi-year
agreement with OneTeam, giving Panini the ability to produce, distribute,
promote, and sell college trading cards featuring the NIL of current men’s
and women’s student-athletes.135 To be featured on a Panini trading card,
student-athletes need to simply sign up with OneTeam and opt-in to the
agreement via its deals platform.136 In exchange, Panini pays a royalty rate
for the group player rights, divided equally amongst all student-athletes
included in the program.137
As the commercial landscape continues to develop for student-athletes,
agencies like OneTeam are positioned to maximize student-athletes’ value
through lucrative group licensing agreements. However, while these
agencies can facilitate NIL deals under the current NIL landscape, they are
limited in scope and ill-equipped to solve the lingering legislative
uncertainties. In other words, these entities lack the ability to make
legislative change to the patchwork of state laws, and their services are
barred in states with more restrictive laws. Additionally, because schools
have the discretion to partner with commercial agencies, the “playing field”
across intercollegiate sports remains uneven. Thus, competitive advantages
that exist for programs in states with less restrictive NIL laws “may be
exacerbated by additional expenditures to help athletes retain the most

https://www.forbes.com/sites/karenweaver/2021/05/25/determining-an-athletes-fair-market-value-isthe-next-hurdle-for-nil-these-two-companies-could-solve-that/?sh=738f026019e2.
132. What We Do, ALTIUS SPORTS PARTNERS, https://www.altiussportspartners.com/what-we-do
(last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
133. Brandr is a third-party agency that “work[s] with licensees to create and market co-branded
college
products
utilizing
group
licensing
rights.”
See
THE
BRANDR GROUP,
https://www.thebrandrgroup.com (last visited May 24, 2022).
134. Michael Smith, SBJ College: OneTeam Partners Looks to Get Ahead of NIL, SPORTS BUS. J.
(Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/SB-Blogs/Newsletter-College/2021/04/15.aspx.
135. Panini America and OneTeam Partners Announce Exclusive Landmark Agreement to Include
College Athlete NIL on Trading Cards, PANINI AM.: BLOG (July 22, 2021),
https://blog.paniniamerica.net/panini-america-and-oneteam-partners-announce-exclusive-landmarkagreement-to-include-college-athlete-nil-on-trading-cards/.
136. Welcome to College Athlete Group Licensing, supra note 128.
137. Kristi Dosh, New Group Licensing Deal Gives Student Athletes Their Own Trading Cards,
FORBES (July 22, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristidosh/2021/07/22/new-grouplicensing-deal-gives-student-athletes-their-own-trading-cards/?sh=d47bb70d92bf.
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profitable endorsement contracts,” further perpetuating inequities among
student-athletes.138
A uniform, centralized group licensing system is necessary for the
revival of EA’s college football video game franchise and other multi-player
products featuring student-athletes from different states. An indvidual
student-athlete’s NIL is more valuable as part of a group because, for
example, EA wants to depict an entire team or league in its video games
without the hassle of negotiating with athletes on an individual basis. And
for many student-athletes, group licensing may be the only way to “score”
NIL compensation. Consider a starting offensive lineman or a rotating
defensive back. Under organized group licensing deals, these players will
receive a cut for the use of their NIL, or at least an annual check from EA.139
In exchange, EA gathers the intellectual property needed to develop its video
game in a cost-effective and “simple” fashion. Simply put, group licensing
creates opportunities for both student-athletes and companies hoping to reap
the benefits of NIL.
In sum, individual NIL rights promote a marketplace wherein many
student-athletes can capitalize off their NIL value—however, just as many
student-athletes may be left out without group licensing. With the lack of an
efficient licensing scheme, where does this leave companies hoping to
develop national, multi-player product lines? As discussed in Part V, federal
legislation is the key to avoiding mass confusion, instilling national
uniformity, and facilitating equitable licensing opportunities between
companies and student-athletes.

V. FEDERAL LEGISLATION IN THE ENDZONE
The NCAA’s hands-off approach perpetuates an uneven playing field
for student-athletes engaging in NIL activities. Furthermore, the
inconsistency in state laws undermine any NCAA response that seeks to
impose a uniform set of rules across the states. The uncertainty stemming
from a lack of uniformity creates a major barrier to predictability, making it
harder for companies to obtain individual licenses from student-athletes and
for student-athletes to have access to NIL opportunities.
The overarching question is whether intercollegiate sports can continue
operating in a structure where every institution and state abides by a different
set of NIL rules and regulations.140 Licensing with student-athletes across
different states and schools, and adhering the NIL policies enforced within
138. Thompson, supra note 115, at 1377-78.
139. Malaika Underwood, The Rising Tide: Why and How Cobranded Group Licensing Works,
ATHLETICDIRECTORU, https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/the-rising-tide-why-and-how-cobrandedgroup-licensing-works/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
140. LEAD1 ASSOCIATION, NAME, IMAGE, AND LIKENESS (“NIL”) INSTITUTIONAL REPORT 1, 17 (Oct.
2021),
https://lead1association.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/LEAD1-NIL-Report-Issue-3.pdf
[hereinafter LEAD1 REPORT].
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each, is unnecessarily burdensome. Beyond the nuances of navigating
differing NIL laws, the “default” licensing scheme (i.e., individual
negotiations with each student-athlete) gives rise to imbalance, as some
players may not have the opportunity to license their NIL rights, much less
receive fair compensation. With these complications in mind, a uniform set
of rules is necessary to integrate student-athlete NIL into licensed products
in a meaningful way.141 In other words, there is a pressing need for
congressional action.
A federally regulated scheme would absolve most of the problems
created by a patchwork of state laws and promote a uniform NIL landscape.
The solution is simple: there needs to be federal legislation that preempts
state law and implements a licensing structure to facilitate broad NIL deals.
Section A briefly summarizes a select number of current federal bill
proposals, limiting the discussion to “relevant” provisions regarding
oversight and NIL compensation within each. Section B recommends the
creation of an independent NIL entity enacted by Congress, designed to
operate on behalf of student-athletes, function as a regulatory committee, and
facilitate new products and services with large companies by means of group
licensing.
A. PENDING FEDERAL BILL PROPOSALS
Intervention by Congress is necessary to create an efficient system for
monitoring and administering student-athletes’ licensing activities, and for
“sewing” the patchwork of varying state law. Multiple federal bills have been
introduced in the Senate and the House.142 However, at the time of this Note,
none have been passed. This Section discusses the following five bill
proposals: the Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act of 2020, Student-Athlete
Level Playing Field Act, Collegiate Athlete Compensation Rights Act,
College Athlete Bill of Rights, and College Athlete Economic Freedom
Act.143
Senator Marco Rubio’s (R-Fla.) Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act
(“Fairness Act”) provides that the NCAA must permit student-athletes to
“earn compensation from a third party as a result of the use of the name,
image or likeness of such student-athlete.”144 However, rather than outline a

141. NIL FAQS, supra note 108.
142. At the time of this Note, seven bills have been introduced. See, e.g., Student-Athlete Equity Act,
H.R. 1804, 116th Cong. (2019); Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act, S. 4004, 116th Cong. (2020);
Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, H.R. 8382, 116th Cong. (2020); Collegiate Athlete
Compensation Rights Act, S. 5003, 116th Cong. (2020); College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 5062, 116th
Cong. (2020); College Athlete Economic Freedom Act, S. 238, 117th Cong. (2021); Amateur Athletes
Protection and Compensation Act of 2021, S. 414, 117th Cong. (2021).
143. This Section will not address Congressman Mark Walker’s (R-N.C.) Student-Athlete Equity Act
or Senator Jerry Moran’s (R-Kan.) Amateur Athletes Protection and Compensation Act of 2021.
144. S. 4004, 116th Cong. § 3(1)(a) (2020).
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detailed national NIL policy, the Fairness Act remains broad, and defers all
rulemaking authority to the NCAA.145 Rubio’s bill is perhaps among the
most NCAA-friendly ones, giving the association the power to create rules
deemed necessary to preserve the amateur status of student-athletes and
granting it immunity from litigation over student-athletes’ right of
publicity.146 It does not provide for NIL group licensing or an independent
NIL entity.
A second bill proposal, Congressman Emanuel Cleaver’s (D-Mo.) and
Congressman Anthony Gonzalez’s (R-Ohio) Student Athlete Level Playing
Field Act (“Playing Field Act”), seeks to maintain the NCAA’s principle of
amateurism, while prohibiting universities, conferences, and the NCAA
from restricting student-athletes’ NIL opportunities.147 These prohibitions
include endorsements pertaining to “illicit” categories, such as tobacco,
alcohol, and gambling.148 The Playing Field Act would create a thirteenmember commission comprised of current and former athletes, coaches,
directors, and administrators, “whose role would be to recommend ways for
legislators to change the law as the nascent marketplace for college athletes
becomes [clearer] and any unintended consequences emerge.”149 This
congressional oversight committee would implement balance into the NIL
quandary by giving “NIL stakeholders” a say in legislative recommendations
for all things NIL.150 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would then be
tasked with the responsibility of NIL enforcement.151
Senator Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) introduced the Collegiate Athlete
Compensation Rights Act (“Compensation Act”).152 The bill’s fundamental
purpose is “[t]o protect the rights of student-athletes, to provide for
transparency and accountability with respect to student-athlete name, image,
and likeness agreements, and to establish an independent entity for
intercollegiate athletics.”153 The NCAA, “a conference, or an institution may
not adopt or maintain a contract, rule, regulation, standard, or other
requirement that prevents or unduly restricts a student-athlete from earning”
NIL compensation for the use of their NIL.154 The compensation must be
145. Gregory Marino, Federal NIL Laws: Future or Fantasy?, SPORTS BUS. J. (Oct. 13, 2021),
https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/SB-Blogs/COVID19-OpEds/2021/10/13-Marino.aspx.
146. Michael D. Fasciale, Comment, The Patchwork Problem: A Need for National Uniformity to
Ensure an Equitable Playing Field for Student-Athletes’ Name, Image, and Likeness Compensation, 52
SETON HALL L. REV. 899, 919-20 (2022).
147. H.R. 8382, 116th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2020).
148. Id. § 2(a)(2).
149. Fasciale, supra note 146, at 920-21.
150. State
and
Federal
NIL
Legislation
Breakdown,
ATHLETICDIRECTORU,
https://athleticdirectoru.com/sanil/state-and-federal-nil-legislation-breakdown/ (last visited May 24,
2022).
151. H.R. 8382, § 2(b).
152. S. 5003, 116th Cong. (2020).
153. Id.
154. Id. § 4(a)(1).
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“commensurate with market value” and “[a]n institution may not, directly or
indirectly, provide covered compensation to a student-athlete.”155 Schools
must publish annual reports regarding all student-athletes’ NIL deals,
including each agreement’s effective date, terms, and covered
compensation.156
Importantly, the Compensation Act provides that an “independent
entity for intercollegiate athletics shall be a private, independent, selfregulatory, nonprofit corporation.”157 The entity’s purpose would be to
develop rules and standards “to maintain fairness and integrity in amateur
intercollegiate athletics and the principle of amateurism in intercollegiate
athletic competition.”158 The FTC would be assigned with choosing the
makeup of the group and would have final approval over any rules or
standards promogulated by the entity, in addition to the authority to enforce
those rules.159
Perhaps the most widely publicized bill, sponsored by Senator Cory
Booker (D-N.J.), along with Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Senator
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), and Senator Brian Schatz (D-Haw.), is the
College Athletes Bill of Rights (“CABOR”), introduced in 2020.160 CABOR
addresses issues beyond NIL rights, making it “the most player-friendly
proposal to date.”161 The bill would establish a federal commission “to be
known as the Commission of College Athletics” (“Commission”).162 The
Commission would be a “federally chartered corporation” with a ninemember board of directors, five of whom are required to be former
intercollegiate athletes.163 Its purpose would be to “act for the benefit of all
college athletes,” and “protect the economic interests of college athletes[]”
among other things.164 The Commission’s responsibilities would be largely
regulatory, handling things like setting endorsement contract criteria,
distributing NIL reports, and providing a venue for NIL disputes.165
CABOR provides that student-athletes can earn NIL compensation
through group licensing deals and enter into co-branding agreements with
schools for the use of institutional intellectual property in NIL activities.166

155. Id. §§ 3(a)(1), 4(c).
156. Id. § 5(d).
157. Id. § 6(a).
158. Id. § 6(e)(1)(A)(ii).
159. Id. § 6(b)(1), (e)(1)(D).
160. S. 5062, 116th Cong. (2020).
161. State and Federal NIL Legislation Breakdown, supra note 150. This Note does not dissect those
additional rights and benefits.
162. See generally S. 5062, §§ 11, 12.
163. Id. § 11(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(D)(ii)(I).
164. Id. § 11(a)(1), (a)(2).
165. See generally id. § 11(d).
166. Id. § 3(a)(1), (a)(4). An institution reserves the right to license its intellectual property at its
discretion. See generally id. § 3(a).
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Additionally, CABOR imposes a substantial revenue sharing component,
requiring that “the institution of higher education associated with the covered
sports team shall transfer” fifty percent of all “commercial sports NIL
revenue”167 to student-athletes.168 Royalties may be distributed “directly” to
student-athletes by the institution.169 This definition adopts a broad
understanding of NIL benefits, and closely resembles true “pay-for-play” as
it presumably includes all earnings athletic departments make.170
Finally, Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Congresswoman Lori
Trahan (D-Mass.) proposed the College Athlete Economic Freedom Act
(“Freedom Act”).171 The bill explicitly provides that the NCAA and schools
cannot restrict “college athletes or prospective college athletes, individually
or as a group, from marketing the use of their names, images, likenesses, and
athletic reputations.”172 Further, the Freedom Act provides student-athletes
with the right to “collective representative to facilitate group licensing
agreement[s].”173 The Freedom Act is the “only federal bill that does not give
the NCAA or any other body an ability to regulate the products athletes
endorse.”174 Much like other bills, the FTC is responsible for enforcement of
these rights.175
A common theme amongst the federal bill proposals is guaranteed NIL
rights for student-athletes. Each of these bills, if signed into law, would allow
student-athletes to earn NIL compensation under a national framework. This
would prohibit the undue restrictions on NIL earning opportunities and
preempt the patchwork of state NIL laws currently in force. Regardless of
what Congress might ultimately pass, the proposed bills paint a picture of
what the future of NIL looks like. At the time of this Note, however, further
congressional action remains nonexistent.
B. HAIL MARY: AN INDEPENDENT, THIRD-PARTY LICENSING ENTITY
An independent NIL licensing entity (the “entity”) created by Congress
can serve the best interests of student-athletes while complying with NCAA
rules pertaining to player unionization and “pay-for-play.” The current

167. “Commercial sports NIL revenue” refers to “the amount of total annual revenue generated from
the athletic program at an institution of higher education.” Id. § 5(a)(2)(A).
168. Id. § 5(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(2)(A). Once split in half, “the amount of grant-in-aid the institution of
higher education awards to eligible college athletes that participate on the covered sports team” is
subtracted from the commercial sports NIL revenue. Id. § 5(b)(1)(A)(ii). This number is then divided by
“the number of eligible college athletes that participate in the division during the applicable reporting
year.” Id. § 5(b)(2)(B).
169. Id. § 5(b)(3)(A).
170. Thompson, supra note 115, at 1369.
171. S. 238, 117th Cong. (2021).
172. Id. § 3(a)(1).
173. Id. § 3(a)(3).
174. State and Federal NIL Legislation Breakdown, supra note 150.
175. S. 238, 117th Cong. § 5 (2021).
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federal bill proposals are either silent on the creation of an NIL licensing
entity or only designate the FTC oversight over NIL activities. Though
legislation may include the protection of student-athletes, the FTC’s
inexperience in dealing with the relationships among student-athletes,
schools, and the NCAA is questionable.176 Additionally, the bills
circumscribe that “the FTC would only be delegated enforcement power to
oversee violations of NIL laws, making it entirely prescriptive rather than
active.”177 This Section outlines the structure of an NIL entity with oversight
powers, whose primary purpose would be to negotiate on behalf of studentathletes for group licensing and co-branding opportunities while enforcing
compliance with NIL laws.
1. Formation and Oversight
An independent entity charged with negotiating NIL deals on of
student-athletes’ behalf is necessary to fully achieve student-athletes’ NIL
earning potential and maintain an “even playing field” in intercollegiate
sports. This entity would serve to expand business opportunities between
student-athletes and companies. Instead of unionizing college athletes,
wherein collective bargaining agreements would dictate compensation, the
entity would function like a players’ association in managing the collective
rights of its members to compensate student-athletes for the
commercialization of their NIL rights.178 Because contracts would be
negotiated “on a per-deal basis,” the entity would overcome “the collective
action problem and avoid[] the [NCAA’s] pay-for-play concerns of private
negotiation.”179
Individual student-athletes would retain the right to license outside of
the entity and may pursue valuable endorsement opportunities by virtue of
their value as an individual.180 In other words, they are not strictly bound to
the entity like a players’ association. Regardless of whether a student-athlete
opts for individually negotiated deals, the entity would provide a regulated
structure in which these transactions could be efficiently organized through
the maintenance of a database of NIL activities, licensing agreements,
royalties, and other relevant information.181
Beyond serving as a negotiating party, the independent entity would
monitor NIL activities for compliance with NCAA rules and applicable
laws.182 Operating under a single standard, the entity would “simplify the
176. Katie Gallop, Comment, Timeout: A Case for Using Nil Legislative Momentum to Extend the
Authority of the Department of Education to Regulate the NCAA, 74 ADMIN. L. REV. 161, 187 (2022).
177. Id.
178. See Jorgensen, supra note 95, at 391.
179. Brown et al., supra note 109, at 27.
180. Id. at 28.
181. Id. at 30.
182. Id. at 8.
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administrative and compliance-related demands of group licensing.”183 The
entity would have the authority to resolve disputes among student-athletes,
the NCAA, companies, and other affected third parties as directed by
Congress.184 Designating this regulatory authority to the NCAA under its
present compliance regime—or lack thereof—would further perpetuate the
already-existing hostility between member institutions and the NCAA. Thus,
the governmental oversight afforded by an independent entity both preserves
the relationship between the NCAA and student-athletes and enforces
uniform NIL regulations—while leaving the NCAA to manage compliance
with its own bylaws.185
2. Group Licensing and Royalty Distribution
Many of the current NIL proposals fail to adequately address group
licensing or are silent on the issue altogether. Although the College Athletes
Bill of Rights would provide federal legislation ensuring group licensing
rights, an independent NIL entity would facilitate group licensing and
promote the development of team-based products.186 The entity’s primary
role would be to negotiate licenses through market-based transactions
without interference from the NCAA and its member institutions.187 In doing
so, the entity would enable efficiencies in activities such as licensing and
royalty administration, increasing NIL licensing opportunities for studentathletes and balancing concerns about competitive equity.188
While the entity would be enacted via legislation, the entity’s licensing
scheme would not be legislatively mandated (e.g., compulsory licensing).189
Compulsory licensing exists through “a statutory mandate” and provides
“that the [intellectual property] rights must be licensed to all comers willing

183. Id. at 30.
184. Id. at 8.
185. For example, the NCAA recently addressed its concerns with “NIL collectives” in intercollegiate
sports. See generally NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, INTERIM NAME, IMAGE AND LIKENESS
POLICY
GUIDANCE
REGARDING
THIRD
PARTY
INVOLVEMENT
(May
2022),
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/NIL/May2022NIL_Guidance.pdf. Collectives are “associations
of school-specific boosters that pool resources to offer payments to recruits and/or current players”
purportedly operating independent of a school. Nicole Auerbach, College Leaders ‘Extremely
Concerned’ with NIL Collectives’ Direction: Survey, THE ATHLETIC (May 4, 2022),
https://theathletic.com/news/athletic-directors-ncaa-nil-survey/wA4u5Y8rqf8P/. This Note does not
address collectives or the problems associated therein, rather, collectives serve as an example of NILrelated matters that the NCAA would continue to handle in its role.
186. See supra Part V.A.
187. Brown et al., supra note 109, at 8.
188. Id.
189. “Compulsory licensing” is a government-granted authorization to use a copyright or patent
without the patent holder’s or copyright owner’s permission. See Compulsory Licenses: Everything You
Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.upcounsel.com/compulsory-licenses (last visited May 29,
2022).

Winter 2023

EA SPORTS: IT'S IN THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION

103

to pay the pre-set price.”190 Licensing under this statutory scheme may
reduce transaction costs through predetermined contract terms—however, it
takes a “one-size-fits-all” approach to contracting, regardless of the unique
rights at issue.191 Accordingly, the proposed entity would function like a
Collective-Rights Organization (CRO).192 CROs operate outside of
legislation and differ from compulsory licensing schemes in that contracts
“are the product of internal negotiations by knowledgeable people in the
[relevant] industry,” acknowledging that licenses often vary and may require
terms or pricing unique to each arrangement.193
Congress can draw on two notable examples of CROs—patent pools
and Performing Rights Organizations (PROs)—in formulating a group
licensing solution specific to student-athlete NIL rights.194 Patent pools are
defined as “an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one
or more of their patents to one another or to third parties,” wherein the patent
rights of multiple patent holders are aggregated into a single portfolio.195 The
portfolio is then “made available to member and non-member licensees and
typically the pool allocates a portion of the licensing fees it collects to each
member in proportion to each patent’s value.”196 Through yielding
intellectual property assets via a patent pool, companies may develop new
products, “negotiate fair and reasonable royalties,” and reduce transaction
costs by mitigating “the need for individual licensing agreements.”197
Similarly, in the music industry, PROs serve as an intermediary
between copyright holders and parties who wish to use copyrighted works in
public places.198 PROs ensure that “songwriters and publishers are paid for
the use of their music by collecting royalties on behalf of the rights owner,”
and distributing them accordingly.199 To accomplish this, PROs aggregate
music copyrights into a single portfolio and negotiate portfolio licenses on
behalf of copyright holders (e.g., musicians, songwriters, and publishers).200
190. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective
Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 1328.
193. Id. at 1300.
194. Brown et al., supra note 109, at 7.
195. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., PATENT POOLS AND ANTITRUST – A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
3
(2014),
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipcompetition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also Brown et al., supra note 109, at 8.
198. Desi Thorne, Music Licensing 101: What Is a Performing Rights Organization?, BANDZOOGLE:
THE BANDZOOGLE BLOG (Sept. 11, 2015), https://bandzoogle.com/blog/music-licensing-101-what-is-aperforming-rights-organization.
199. Id.
200. Walter McDonough, What Are the Performing Rights Organizations Doing to Protect
Songwriters and Musicians?, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (Feb. 26, 2002),
http://futureofmusic.org/article/what-are-performing-rights-organizations-doing-protect-songwritersand-musicians.

104

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

45:1

Absent a PRO, licensors would need to contact each licensee and negotiate
individual licensing agreements with each person or entity.201 Accordingly,
PROs exist to alleviate the burdens of transactional costs, and time,
associated with collecting individual licenses.
Akin to patent pools and PROs, the proposed independent entity would
provide a method for companies to license the collective NIL rights of all
players on a team without the difficulties of individual player valuation.202
By organizing things from the student-athletes’ side, licensees aren’t faced
with hundreds of one-off agreements when assembling broad NIL deals and
student-athletes can maximize their earnings.203 This structure appeals to the
majority of student-athletes because it allows revenues to be shared among
all athletes in the relevant group. Under this group licensing method, player
valuation is straightforward, bypassing the complexities of determining
player compensation in an underdeveloped marketplace. Royalty payouts for
group licensing arrangements could either vary by contract, demand equal
payouts for all contracts, or use a weighted distribution approach.204 For
individualized products like jerseys or trading cards, compensation would be
based on the sales of products containing the student-athlete’s NIL, and
student-athletes would receive a share specific to those sales.205 If it is not
possible to identify individual sales, as is the case with team-branded
products like video games, then revenue would be divided evenly among the
athletes included in each licensing program.206
The reality is, less than two percent of student-athletes will go on to
play professionally, and it is those student-athletes that can readily capitalize
on their NIL.207 For student-athletes that lack the popularity to sign
individual NIL deals, group licensing presents the greatest opportunity to
generate the highest NIL income. This is especially true for women’s college
athletes, as group licensing has been demonstrated to increase women’s
professional athletes’ income.208 Accordingly, NIL legislation may only
yield valuable earnings if student-athletes are permitted to reap the benefits
of group licensing as facilitated through an independent entity.
201. Id.
202. Caron, supra note 129.
203. NIL: All of a Sudden, but a Long Time Coming, LICENSING INT’L (July 6, 2021),
https://licensinginternational.org/news/nil-all-of-a-sudden-but-a-long-time-coming/.
204. Brown et al., supra note 109, at 31-32.
205. ONETEAM, supra note 128; see also Brown et al., supra note 109, at 32 (noting that, as a
condition, “[the NIL licensing entity] would deduct its fee from the royalties it collects and distribute the
net payment to the college athlete.”).
206. ONETEAM, supra note 128.
207. LEAD1 REPORT, supra note 141, at 16.
208. Alicia Jessop, Fool Me Once, Shame on You; Fool Me Twice, Shame on Me: Why Congress Must
Grant NCAA Athletes Group Licensing and Organization Rights in Name, Image and Likeness
Legislation, HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://harvardjsel.com/2020/08/fool-me-onceshame-on-you-fool-me-twice-shame-on-me-why-congress-must-grant-ncaa-athletes-group-licensingand-organization-rights-in-name-image-and-likeness-legislation.

Winter 2023

EA SPORTS: IT'S IN THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION

105

3. Co-Branding School Intellectual Property with Student-Athlete NIL
The same efficiencies and equity group licensing apply to co-branding.
Federal legislation permitting the use of institutional logos and other forms
of school intellectual property in dealings between companies and studentathletes further optimizes the benefits of NIL compensation. Drawing from
the provisions proposed in CABOR, federal legislation should preempt state
laws and provide that student-athletes are permitted to enter into co-branding
agreements with schools for the use of institutional intellectual property in
NIL dealings.209 However, Congress should aim to preserve schools’
discretionary rights to license their intellectual property. A possible
concession could be to consolidate the use of school intellectual property and
institutional marks only “for co-branding products such as video games and
jersey sales.”210 This provides that schools retain control over their
intellectual property rights while removing the state-implemented legal
barriers preventing certain schools from co-branding in the first place.
Through its group licensing function, an independent NIL entity would
represent student-athletes in NIL dealings between companies and schools
to develop licensing opportunities for the concurrent use of student-athlete
NIL and school intellectual property. This “joint venture” allows both
student-athletes and schools “to capitalize on revenues from video games,
jerseys, sports merchandising, advertisements, and other licensing products,”
respectively.211 For example, the National Football League Players
Association (NFLPA)212 group licensing program works to provide licensees
with a total of six or more National Football League (NFL) players’ NIL on
or in conjunction with retail items like EA’s Madden NFL Games.213 In
addition to contracting with the NFLPA, EA negotiates a license with the
NFL and its teams to utilize their trademarks, logos, and other intellectual
property in the video game.214 Once royalties are collected, the NFLPA
distributes equal payments amongst all member-athletes and the NFL
receives its own portion of the revenues.215 A similar arrangement could be
made between the NCAA, its member schools, and student-athletes to revive
EA’s college football video game franchise—and with royalty distributions
209. See discussion supra Part V.A; see also S. 5062, 116th Cong. § 3(a) (2020).
210. Thompson, supra note 115, at 1383.
211. Id.
212. The NFLPA is a labor union that represents NFL players. See How the NFLPA Works, NFLPA,
https://nflpa.com/about (last visited May 24, 2022). The NFLPA “[r]epresents all players in matters
concerning wages, hours and working conditions and protects their rights as professional football players”
and “[e]nhances and defends the image of players and their profession on and off the field,” among other
things. Id.
213. See Licensing, NFLPA, https://nflpa.com/partners/licensing (last visited May 24, 2022).
214. NIL FAQS, supra note 108.
215. The current royalty distribution for Madden 21 is unknown; however, “[t]he 2017 active player
payment [was] $17,662 and 2018 payment [was] $16,966.” See Tom Pelissero (@TomPelissero),
TWITTER (Mar. 21, 2020, 12:29 PM), https://twitter.com/TomPelissero/status/1241446751439118337.
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coming from the entity, not the schools themselves, the NCAA’s rules
against “pay-for-play” remain intact.
The interest in uniform NIL laws has sparked a slew of legislative
proposals. While the attempts to pass federal legislation is headed in the right
direction, further efforts are needed to make meaningful change to NIL. As
the intercollegiate NIL landscape continues to develop on an uneven playing
field, the creation of an independent NIL entity by Congress would mitigate
the mass confusion stemming from a patchwork of state NIL laws. Such an
entity is best equipped to solve the inequalities across the current NIL
regulatory scheme and encourage orderliness in NIL licensing negotiations,
specifically for companies seeking multi-player product or promotional
lines. Until then, student-athletes, schools, and companies must continue to
advocate for their interests.

VI. TOUCHDOWN: EA SPORTS COLLEGE FOOTBALL
Last year, EA announced its plans to move forward with the
development of EA Sports College Football—and as of June 17, 2022, the
game is scheduled for release in July 2023.216 But in the two-year window
EA afforded themselves for game development, the intercollegiate sports
landscape has and will continue to rapidly evolve.
The announcement came prior to the NCAA rule changes permitting
student-athletes to commercialize their NIL, and it was uncertain whether
student-athletes would be featured in the video game. Following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Alston, EA released the following statement:
We are watching the recent developments regarding student-athlete name,
image and likeness very closely. It’s still very early stages at this point, and
we plan to explore the possibility of including players in EA SPORTS College
Football. For now, our development team is focused on working with our
partners at CLC to ensure the game authentically showcases the great sport of
college football and the more than 100 institutions signed on to be featured in
our game. 217

According to the most recent proposal, dated February 25, 2022, the deal
between EA and CLC includes licenses for nearly 120 FBS schools’
intellectual property—such as logos, stadiums, mascots, and fight songs—as

216. See Anthony Puccio, EA Sports to Bring Back NCAA Football in July 2023, FRONT OFF. SPORTS
(June 17, 2022, 4:00 PM), https://frontofficesports.com/ea-sports-to-bring-back-ncaa-football-in-july2023/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=linkedin&utm_campaign=article.
217. Brian Jones, EA Sports Makes Announcement on NCAA Football Video Game Following NIL
Ruling, POPCULTURE (July 1, 2021, 3:36 PM), https://popculture.com/sports/news/ea-sports-makesannouncement-ncaa-football-video-game-nil-ruling/.
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well as licenses for athletic conferences and bowl games.218 EA is currently
working on securing “team-specific audio assets,” like student-section
chants and band songs, from the institutions, suggesting that EA “is seeking
to recreate the stadium experience as closely as possible for each school.”219
While EA continues to “collect game assets and develop game play to meet
market demands,”220 the question remains: what does EA intend to do about
the player-avatars?
To maximize the realistic feel of the gameplay, there must be a
resemblance between the player-avatars in EA Sports College Football and
their real-life counterparts. The appeal of EA’s college-branded video games
is that consumers can play as college football players on their favorite
team.221 If EA’s model is to encourage consumers to purchase the game each
year, the strategy fails to work if the video game is premised solely on the
use of schools’ logos and stadiums.222 Should EA create a game that includes
virtual players who look and “feel” nothing like real players, consumer
interest will be lost.223 In other words, EA needs to integrate student-athletes’
NIL in its video game to have a successful reboot.
Accordingly, EA must secure the rights to student-athletes’ NIL for use
in EA Sports College Football if it wants its video game to not only be
successful, but free of any potential claims for misappropriation of studentathletes’ right of publicity. A game with nameless avatars who happen to
have the same physical characteristics, jersey numbers, and skills as their
respective real-life players inevitably leads to litigation over the
misappropriation of student-athletes’ NIL—and EA need look no further
than previous litigation to reach this determination.224 However, it is likely
that EA is not ignorant of this reality, and publicly addressed the inclusion
of student-athletes in EA Sports College Football. On a conference call with
EA’s investors in August 2021, CEO Andrew Wilson addressed the
company’s development plans for the video game franchise.225 Wilson
believes it is “likely very possible for [EA] to integrate name image and
218. Matt Brown, Here’s Everything I Know About EA Sports College Football, with Updated Info:,
EXTRA POINTS (June 17, 2022), https://www.extrapointsmb.com/heres-everything-i-know-about-easports-college-football-with-updated-info/.
219. Id.
220. Puccio, supra note 216 (internal quotations omitted).
221. Olga Kharif, What’s Going on with EA Sports College Football?, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2021,
3:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-08-27/ea-sports-college-football-whats-the-latest.
222. Id.
223. Darren Heitner, The Complexity of EA Sports College Football Without Athlete Group Licensing
in Place, ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 3, 2021, 4:47 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2021/02/the-complexity-ofea-sports-college-football-without-athlete-group-licensing-in-place/.
224. Id.; see also discussion supra Sections III.A.1-4.
225. See Electronic Arts, Inc. (EA) CEO Andrew Wilson on Q1 2022 Results – Earnings Call
Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 4, 2021, 11:43 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4445193electronic-arts-inc-ea-ceo-andrew-wilson-on-q1-2022-results-earnings-call-transcript.
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likeness with athletes according to whatever rule sets may emerge as to how
they may engage with [EA] in that context.”226 While promising, EA has
taken no further steps to demonstrate its commitment to licensing with
student-athletes, as it merely continues to “keep tabs on” the ever-changing
collegiate NIL landscape.227
It should be noted that EA wants to include student-athlete NIL in its
video game, and is more than willing to pay players for the right to do so.228
The remaining hurdle for EA to overcome is navigating group licensing.229
For the reasons articulated above,230 it is difficult to navigate individual
licensing with a large student-athlete population without an entity organizing
them as one unit.231 In lieu of a players’ association, an independent NIL
entity established by Congress would assume the role of facilitating and
negotiating an agreement on behalf of all players featured in the video game,
in addition to distributing royalty payments thereafter. Much like the Ninth
Circuit noted in O’Bannon, there is little reason to think that a group
licensing arrangement could not be facilitated to create EA Sports College
Football—especially with an independent, congressional entity providing
the mechanism for EA to proceed with negotiations.232
Acknowledging that Congress will likely be the final peacemaker of
conflicting state laws and NCAA guidelines, this Note presents what the
future of NIL could resemble for EA Sports College Football. EA should
stop “explor[ing] the possibility of including players in EA SPORTS College
Football,” and start preparing for NIL negotiations with student-athletes.233
In the meantime, NCAA Football fans must continue to patiently wait for the
pieces to come together.

226. Id. Wilson also added: “[a]nd we are building the architecture of the game with a database
structure so that if and when that comes online, we’ll be able to add back to the game very seamlessly.”
Id.
227. Jones, supra note 217.
228. See Brown, supra note 218.
229. Despite the progress being made, one of the lingering holdouts for many institutions is that “there
is not currently an established mechanism for paying athletes for their likenesses to appear in the game.”
Brown, supra note 218.
230. See discussion supra Part IV.
231. Brandr recently announced its plans to execute and develop the company’s video games
strategies. Pete Nakos, Brandr Group Extending Group Licensing Program into Video Games, ON3 (July
18, 2022), https://www.on3.com/nil/news/the-brandr-group-group-licensing-program-video-gamespartnerships-nil-ea-sports-ncaa-football-14/. This deal would seem to create a framework for EA to create
a college football video game group license deal. However, as discussed supra, this isn’t enough, as not
all institutions have Brandr’s services available as an option, and state laws continue to pose a challenge
for the efficiency of its plan.
232. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting
that “[T]here is every reason to believe that, if permitted to do so, EA or another video game company
would pay NCAA athletes for their NIL rights.”).
233. See Jones, supra note 217.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Individual endorsements and sponsorships are being signed left and
right—but some of the largest NIL deals have yet to come to fruition. Absent
a system for reaching a broad population of student-athletes, navigating
licensing agreements for multi-player product lines proves challenging, and
many student-athletes may be unable to capitalize on the value of their NIL
as individuals. This Note recommends Congress promulgate an independent
NIL entity to oversee NIL licensing deals and establish uniform NIL rules.
An independent entity is best equipped to promote a landscape wherein
student-athletes can earn substantially more revenue from commercializing
their NILs and consumers can obtain the products they want.
While Nick Saban and Jimbo Fisher may not see eye to eye, they can
agree on one thing: “[the rules] just need[] to be uniform[] across the board
and it’s hard because the government’s [going to] have to get involved with
it.”234 In other words, the current intercollegiate NIL landscape and
patchwork of state laws governing NIL compensation require federal
legislative intervention. EA Sports College Football is back: it just needs
student-athletes, and Congress, in the game.

234. TexAgs, supra note 2. Similarly, Saban remarked that “we got to get an antitrust or whatever it
is from a federal government standpoint [because] [NIL] is not going to change.” See Alabama Crimson
Tide, supra note 1.

110

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

***

45:1

